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Introduction 
This appeal hinges on two questions: (i) whether the trial court failed to instruct 
the jury adequately on the specific intent element of aggravated assault and (ii) whether 
the trial court's failure to do so was prejudicial. The answer to both questions is yes. 
The jury instructions presented jurors with the option of finding Mr. Hutchings 
guilty of aggravated assault if it found only that he had a general intent to engage in 
conduct that, in fact, resulted in serious bodily injury. The instructions did not require the 
jury to find that Mr. Hutchings had a specific intent to cause serious bodily injury. The 
court of appeals recognized that the jury instructions allowed the jury to convict 
Mr. Hutchings based only upon a general intent to engage in conduct. The court of 
appeals affirmed the conviction, however, because it held that a general intent instruction 
was appropriate. The State concedes in the response brief that the court of appeals was 
incorrect because aggravated assault was a specific intent crime. 
The State instead argues that no reasonable juror—a class that, according to the 
State's logic, excludes the court of appeals' panel—could have misunderstood the jury 
instructions as permitting a conviction based only upon a general intent to engage in 
conduct. The State's argument presupposes that, in reviewing the jury instructions, the 
jury understood and correctly applied a distinction drawn by logicians between the 
inclusive disjunction and exclusive disjunction. The State's 5-page explanation of how 
the instructions can be reconciled employing that distinction is so complex that it cannot 
be ascribed to jurors. And because the jury instructions allow for conviction based upon 
a general intent, not only was it plain error for the trial court to give the instructions, but 
there also is no conceivable strategic reason for trial counsel to have agreed to them, 
leaving trial counsel's doing so constitutionally ineffective representation. 
The jury instructions were prejudicial. At trial, Ms. Cuddeback (the victim) 
testified that when she was assaulted, she clawed at Mr. Hutchings' face, causing 
Mr. Hutchings to push her hand away. In the process of having her hand pushed away 
from his face, Ms. Cuddeback's hand struck a bookshelf and bones in her hand were 
broken. For that to constitute aggravated assault, the jury must have found (i) that her 
injury of a broken hand constituted "serious bodily injury" under the aggravated assault 
statute and (ii) that when Mr. Hutchings pushed Ms. Cuddeback's hand away from his 
face, he acted with the specific intent to cause that injury rather than with the general 
intent to push her hand away from his face or a specific intent to cause an injury less than 
a "serious bodily injury." In this case, allowing the jury to convict if it found only that 
Mr. Hutchings intended the conduct, not serious bodily injury, was prejudicial. 
The State attempts to avoid this straightforward analysis by asserting that the 
prosecution's representations to the jury throughout trial were so clear that the jury could 
not have been confused by the instructions. The State overstates the clarity of the 
prosecutor's representations, especially during closing arguments when the prosecutor 
stated, for example, "He takes her right hand as [sic] she's been using to scratch at him, 
takes her right hand and throws it back, intentionally throws it back, not accidentally, but 
intentionally throws it back, intentionally causing the serious bodily injury where her 
hand is broken." (R. 271:206-07.) That statement is far from clear concerning whether 
the jury could convict Mr. Hutchings if it found only that he "intentionally throws it 
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back" without also finding that he "intended serious bodily injury." The State's attempt 
to supplement the confusing jury instructions with closing arguments fails. 
As a final alternative, the State argues that the issues presented in the opening 
brief are not properly before the court because they were raised in an Anders brief before 
the court of appeals. To understand the flaw in the State's argument, consider what 
happened in the court of appeals. Mr. Hutchings understood the problems with the jury 
instructions and included it in his supplement to the Anders brief, but (i) appellate 
counsel who is charged with providing effective assistance did not, (ii) the State which 
reviewed the Anders brief and Mr. Hutchings' submission and responded to part of it did 
not, and, most important, (iii) the court of appeals which is charged with identifying 
meritorious claims in Anders briefs and Mr. Hutchings' submission did not. It would be 
cruel indeed if the issue were somehow beyond this court's review because trial counsel, 
the trial court, appellate counsel, the State, and the court of appeals all missed an issue 
that was not only meritorious but, as the State concedes by declining to defend the court 
of appeals' opinion, was correct. Because Mr. Hutchings raised the issue himself, the 
issue is properly before this court. 
This court should vacate the aggravated assault conviction and remand for a new 
trial on that charge. 
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Argument 
I. The Jury Instructions Did Not Accurately State the Law 
The law concerning specific intent was not adequately conveyed to the jury. As a 
matter of constitutional law, "[t]he jury must be instructed with respect to all the legal 
elements that it must find to convict of the crime charged, and the absence of such an 
instruction is reversible error as a matter of law." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ^ f 26, 52 
P.3d 1210; see also Middleton v. McNeil 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) ("In a criminal trial, 
the State must prove every element of the offense, and a jury instruction violates due 
process if it fails to give effect to that requirement.") 
To be adequate, jury instructions taken as a whole must "fairly instruct the jury on 
the applicable law." Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86,137, 993 P.2d 191. But where an 
element of an offense is especially important, jury instructions must do more than simply 
recite black-letter law or statutory language. State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, ^ 30, 243 P.3d 
1250. Rather, a jury instruction must be evaluated "in light o f the statutory elements of 
an offense "to determine whether [the instructions] adequately stated the State's burden." 
Id. Tf 22. The court has recognized that the concept of specific intent—a concept 
generations of law students have had difficultly grasping—requires particular precision to 
avoid juror confusion "with respect to the issue of intent."1 Id. f^ 51. The inquiry is 
1
 In State v. Jeffs, the court rejected a jury instruction related to specific intent where "the 
jury could have convicted [the defendant] if it found that [the defendant] intentionally did 
some act, and such intentional act unintentionally 'aided'" the principal in committing the 
underlying offense. Id If 52; see also State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981) 
("When a court is called upon to tender [general intent and specific intent instructions], it 
must take specific care that the instructions remain distinct and cannot be confused or 
misapplied. Because the instructions . . . failed to explain adequately the distinction 
between the general and specific intent requirements or relate those requirements to the 
facts of the case and the different crimes charged, they were misleading and confusing."). 
A 
whether there is a "reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged 
instruction in a way that violates the Constitution." Middleton, 541 U.S. at 437 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 
In relevant part, the jury instruction explaining specific intent to the jury here 
stated: "A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent or willfully with 
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious 
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." (R. 198, hereinafter 
"Instruction 27" (emphasis added).) To use the type of logical analysis in the State's 
brief, the placement of the word "or" in the emphasized portion of Instruction 27 makes it 
is unclear whether the prior modifiers—intentionally, willfully, desire, conscious 
objective—modify the phrase "cause the result" or modify only the phrase "to engage in 
the conduct." That ambiguity results from the mixed use of the "inclusive 'or'" and the 
"exclusive 'or'" within Instruction 27. Because of that ambiguity, a straightforward 
reading of Instruction 27 promotes the understanding that Mr. Hutchings need not have 
intended serious bodily injury to be guilty of aggravated assault. 
Perhaps the best evidence of that ambiguity is how it was understood by the court 
of appeals. Even with training in the art of splicing legal syntax and the complexities 
surrounding general and specific intent, the court understood the instructions to authorize 
a conviction based on general intent. State v. Hutchings, 2009 UT App 330, Tf 4 (Mem. 
2
 Compare Wikipedia: "Exclusive or," available at http://en.wikipedia.org 
/wiki/Exclusive_or (last accessed Feb. 3, 2011) ("The logical operation exclusive 
disjunction, also called exclusive or . . . is a type of logical disjunction on two operands 
that results in a value of true if exactly one of the operands has a value of true.") with 
Wikipedia: "Logical disjunction," available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inclusive_or 
(last accessed Feb. 3, 2011) ("[A] two-place logical operator or . . . results in true 
whenever one or more of its operands are true.") 
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Dec). The complex legal analysis ascribed to jurors should not be greater than that 
employed by appellate judges. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, 
"Jurors do not sit in solitary isolation booths parsing instructions for subtle shades of 
meaning in the same way that lawyers might." Bovde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380-
81 (1990). Yet that is precisely what the State would have this court suppose the jurors 
did in this case. 
The State's attempt to demonstrate the clarity of Instruction 27—an argument that 
took more than 4 months3 to construct and reads like a proof of a mathematical 
formula—is unpersuasive. The State's argument hinges on the presence of another 
instruction (Instruction 14) that sets forth the elements of aggravated assault. (Resp. Br. 
at 21.) Because Instruction 14 required the jury to find that the defendant "intentionally 
caused serious bodily injury," the State contends, the jury could not have been confused 
about what the term "intentionally" modified in Instruction 27. (Resp. Br. at 24; R. 186.) 
That argument is belied by the State's own reasoning. The State explains, "Instruction 27 
. . . was not limited to any particular crime, but was instead applicable to all three crimes 
at issue This does not mean, however, that all of Instruction 27 applied to all of the 
elements of all of the crimes. Instead Instruction 27 applied only on a clause-specific 
basis. . . . More importantly, Instruction 27's definition of intentional conduct was multi-
faceted as well." (Resp. Br. at 22 (emphasis added).) Having set forth that analysis, the 
State explains that "Instruction 27 told the jury how to interpret any element that called 
for either intentional conduct or an intended result." (Id. at 23 (emphasis added).) 
Indeed, measured from the time Mr. Hutchings raised this issue in his pro se brief on 
certiorari, the State had more than eight months to formulate this response. 
Defendant agrees wholeheartedly with that last part. That's the problem. By the 
State's own reasoning, the jury's sole direction as to the difference between specific and 
general intent was (i) a "multi-faceted" instruction that applied (ii) to three different 
crimes, (iii) but not to "all of the elements of all of the crimes," and (iv) "applied only on 
a clause-specific basis." (Id. at 22.) The State's argument, much like the unfortunate 
instruction in this case, overlooks the natural and probable way the jurors were likely to 
understand language and the need for clarity related to the intent element of a specific 
intent crime. The jury instructions regarding specific intent were inadequate. 
II. Mr. Hutchings Was Prejudiced by the Erroneous Jury Instructions 
The faulty jury instruction was prejudicial because, had the jury been properly 
instructed, it is reasonably likely that the jury would not have convicted Mr. Hutchings of 
aggravated assault. A faulty jury instruction requires reversal if there is "a reasonable 
likelihood that the error affected the result." Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, % 20, 993 
P.2d 191. A reasonable likelihood of a better outcome exists when the court's confidence 
in the verdict is undermined, which happens at a point "substantially short" of where a 
court might conclude that a different result was "more probable than not." State v. 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987). The Utah Constitution requires that "[i]n 
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous." Utah Const, art 1, § 10. Accordingly, if 
it is reasonably likely that even one juror voted to convict based on a misapprehension of 
Instruction 27, Mr. Hutchings would not have been convicted and this instruction was 
prejudicial. State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, If 60, 992 P.2d 951 ("Jury unanimity means 
unanimity as to a specific crime and as to each element of the crime."). 
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It is reasonably likely that at least one juror voted to convict based on a 
misunderstanding of the specific intent element of the aggravated assault charge. To 
have convicted Mr. Hutchings at all, the jury must have believed Ms. Cuddeback's 
version of events.4 Her version was as follows: during a fight with Mr. Hutchings she 
began scratching at his face. In her words: "the nails must of hurt him. They were 
cutting him. He grabbed my wrist and threw my hand backwards." (R. 272:55.) That 
testimony supports a finding that Mr. Hutchings intended his conduct, but it also is 
entirely (and in fact more) consistent with a finding that Mr. Hutchings did not intend a 
result of serious bodily injury. And even if jurors believed that Mr. Hutchings intended 
injury, that still would be insufficient. He must have intended serious bodily injury, 
which is defined as "serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of 
the function of any bodily member or organ, or . . . a substantial risk of death." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1) (2005).5 Because Ms. Cuddeback's injury of a broken hand 
barely qualifies—if at all—as a serious bodily injury, even on the State's theory the jury 
may not have found that Mr. Hutchings intended serious bodily injury in pushing 
Ms. Cuddeback's hand away from his face. Regardless of whether a broken hand could 
qualify under the statute, Ms. Cuddeback's testimony falls far short of compelling a 
finding that Mr. Hutchings intended serious bodily injury. 
4
 Mr. Hutchings testified that the injury occurred when Ms. Cuddeback punched him in a 
manner that broke her hand. (R. 271:120-21.) Had the jury believed that version, it 
would have acquitted Mr. Hutchings. 
5
 Compare "serious bodily injury" with "substantial bodily injury" in Utah Code section 
76-1-504(11): "not amounting to serious bodily injury that creates or causes protracted 
physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function 
of any bodily member or organ." 
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Had the jury been adequately instructed Jurors would have had reasonable doubt 
concerning whether Mr. Hutchings formed the requisite specific intent. It is equally 
likely that Mr. Hutchings merely intended to push back her hand to stop her nails from 
"cutting him." In arguing that no such likelihood exists, the State contends that the 
prosecutor's representations to the jury were so clear that the jury knew its charge 
regardless of flaws in the instructions.6 (Resp. Br. at 30-31.) Careful review of the 
record demonstrates that the State has selectively recalled some moments of clarity but 
has overlooked less clear representations. For example, in closing arguments, the 
prosecutor never makes a clear distinction: "He takes her right hand as [sic] she's been 
using to scratch at him, takes her right hand and throws it back, intentionally throws it 
back, not accidentally, but intentionally throws it back, intentionally causing the serious 
bodily injury where her hand is broken." (R. 271:207 (emphasis added).) Elsewhere, he 
states that "[Mr. Hutchings] intentionally caused [the broken hand] because he grabbed 
her hand and he threw it back behind her head. She was trying to protect herself, and he 
grabbed her hand and threw it. He intentionally caused the serious bodily injury." (R. 
271:178 (emphasis added).) 
6
 The State also argues that the jury could have inferred intent to cause serious bodily 
injury from circumstantial evidence of Mr. Hutchings' conduct at the time of the incident. 
(Resp. Br. at 31-33.) That argument fails. Regardless of what the jury might have 
inferred, the problem with Instruction 27 is that it required no inference. Further, 
inferring the intent to cause serious bodily injury from the intent to commit an assault 
would collapse two statutory elements and turn every assault into an aggravated assault 
(or transform aggravated assault into a general intent crime). Potter, 627 P.2d at 78 
(rejecting jury instructions that may have "led the jury to believe they should 
automatically infer the specific intent required for [an offense] from the voluntary doing 
of the act"). 
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In both statements, the State—like the instruction it now defends—conflated 
Mr. Hutchings intentional conduct with the intent to cause a particular result. Indeed, the 
first misstatement is especially important because it was made during rebuttal and was 
one of the last descriptions the jury heard before it was sent to deliberate. The 
prosecutor's comments at trial were not adequate to inform the jury, as the State now 
suggests, that it was to employ the "exclusive 'or'" when interpreting Instruction 27, 
rather than the "inclusive 4or'." The misleading jury instructions were prejudicial. 
III. Mr. Hutchings' Jury Instruction Challenge is Properly Before the Court 
In an attempt to avoid this court's deciding the issues presented above—and to 
explain why neither the State nor appellate counsel cited to the court of appeals three 
controlling authorities demonstrating aggravated assault was a specific intent crime —the 
State argues that the issues set forth in this court's writ of certiorari are not properly 
before the court. The State argues that the issues were not raised before the court of 
appeals and that any jury instruction error was invited. The State is incorrect. 
To be clear, trial counsel did not object to Instruction 27. So in challenging that 
instruction, Mr. Hutchings has been required to show plain error and/or ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Accordingly, in the opening brief Mr. Hutchings set forth his 
claims under those two doctrines. As to plain error, Mr. Hutchings demonstrated that, 
under clearly established law at the time of his trial, a conviction for aggravated assault 
could only be predicated on the specific intent to cause serious bodily injury. (AOB at 
10-11.) As to ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Hutchings demonstrated that trial 
7
 Even in opposing Mr. Hutchings' petition for writ of certiorari, the State represented 
that the jury instructions were correct with regard to the intent required for aggravated 
assault. (Br. in Opp. to Pet. for Writ of Certiorari at 5-6.) 
1 A 
counsel was objectively deficient in failing to object to Instruction 27. (AOB at 11-12.) 
And as to both legal standards, Mr. Hutchings demonstrated the prejudice that flowed 
from the failures of his counsel and of the trial court. (AOB at 12-13.) 
The State argues that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be rejected 
because it was not raised in the court of appeals. The State also argues that 
Mr. Hutchings' plain error argument should be rejected because Mr. Hutchings invited 
the error. The State is incorrect on both counts and, as discussed below, there are no 
impediments to this court resolving the questions presented on certiorari, something the 
State appeared to have recognized in opposing Mr. Hutchings' petition for writ of 
certiorari. (Br. in Opp. to Pet. for Writ of Certiorari at 4-6.) 
A. The State's Preservation Argument Fails Because the Jury Instruction 
Issue Was Sufficiently Raised in the Anders Brief 
The ineffective assistance of counsel issue is properly before the court. To begin, 
the ineffective assistance of counsel issue is precisely the question presented in this 
court's order granting Mr. Hutchings' petition for writ of certiorari. Further, the State's 
argument regarding ineffective assistance of counsel is a red herring, not only because 
Mr. Hutchings was entitled to constitutionally effective counsel in both the trial court and 
on appeal, but also because trial counsel's inviting the error—which he did not—would 
only make the ineffective assistance argument more compelling. Regardless, any 
shortcomings in the manner in which issues were presented to the court of appeals arise 
solely from the rather unique use of an Anders brief, which became irrelevant when the 
court of appeals chose to address the issues on the merits. 
8
 Notably, the State has not moved the court for an order dismissing this appeal on the 
theory that certiorari was improvidently granted. 
11 
As it comes to this court, the case has followed the procedures set forth in State v. 
Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981), which are modeled on the requirements announced 
by the United States Supreme Court in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Those 
cases set forth the requirements for an appellate attorney who believes that all of the 
issues his client seeks to raise on appeal lack merit. To ensure that the defendant's 
constitutional rights are protected, appellate counsel must file a brief setting forth his 
understanding of each issue his client seeks to raise. Clayton, 639 P.2d at 169-70. 
Counsel then must marshal the record in support of his belief that the client's issues lack 
merit. Id at 170. 
Two important safeguards guarantee that counsel has not overlooked a meritorious 
issue. First, his client must be given an opportunity to file a supplemental memorandum 
in support of the issues he seeks to raise. Id. Second, the reviewing court must review 
the entire record along with appellate counsel's brief and the client's supplemental 
memorandum. Id. Unless the reviewing court unanimously concludes that all of the 
issues raised by the defendant lack merit, the court orders counsel to provide full briefing 
on any non-frivolous issues. Id. If the Anders brief contains an argument that merits 
relief, the court also may grant the relief without ordering full briefing. United States v. 
Wallace, No. 09-4700, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24725, at *6 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 2010) (per 
curiam); United States v. Cornette, No. 09-4553, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 19284, at *4-5 
(4th Cir. Sept. 15, 2010) (per curiam). Thus, an issue raised in the client's supplemental 
memorandum is an issue the appellate court must evaluate. 
The Anders brief in this case was a hybrid. It contained one section that addressed 
an issue on the merits. (Add. A at 21-23.) It contained a separate section outlining then-
appellate counsel's belief that Mr. Hutchings' other issues were frivolous. (Add. A at 8-
21.) The court of appeals reviewed the Anders portion of the brief, concluded that it 
contained only frivolous issues, and declined to address any of them. Hutchings, 2009 
UT App 330, Tf 1. The court then addressed the merits section of the brief and rejected 
counsel's argument. Id. fflf 2-3. Then, seeing that Mr. Hutchings' supplemental 
memorandum had raised an issue related to the arguments in the merits section, the court 
of appeals addressed that issue on the merits as well. Id. 114. The issue identified as 
deserving consideration on the merits was raised by Mr. Hutchings as follows: "jwy 
instruction #27 defines intentionally in a general sense but fails to define it specifically to 
intentionally causes serious bodily injury. The intent element of the statute is the element 
upon which the distinction between a more serious crime and a less serious one turns."9 
(Add. B at 3.) In addressing that argument, the court of appeals erroneously concluded 
that Instruction 27 correctly stated the law because aggravated assault was a general 
intent crime. Hutchings, 2009 UT App 330, ^  4. Mr. Hutchings also raised claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, but, based upon its conclusion that Instruction 27 
correctly states the law, the court of appeals specifically stated that it was unnecessary to 
address those claims. IdL 
It is irrelevant that Mr. Hutchings' issues were not in the merits section of 
counsel's brief. Had the court of appeals not erred in holding that aggravated assault was 
9
 Although this statement is raised near the end of Mr. Hutchings' supplemental 
memorandum, it is clear that the court of appeals saw it and recognized it as non-
frivolous. (Add. B at 3.) Not only does the court of appeals' opinion attribute this 
argument directly to Mr. Hutchings, the relevant portion of the court of appeals" opinion 
is directly responsive to this argument (and is not responsive to any issues raised by 
counsel in the Anders brief). See Hutchings, 2009 UT App % 330, U 4. 
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a general intent crime, it could have granted relief based on the arguments presented in 
Mr. Hutchings' supplemental memorandum. At the very least, the court of appeals had 
an obligation to order that those issues be briefed by counsel10 Clayton, 639 P.2d at 170. 
The issues were not frivolous. In fact, the issue regarding specific intent was entirely 
correct. Mr. Hutchings alone correctly identified that Instruction 27 does not reflect that 
aggravated assault was a specific intent crime. Not only did trial counsel fail to see the 
issues, so did appellate counsel. The State failed to recognize the issue was meritorious 
when it reviewed the Anders brief and chose to address it in part. (Add. C at 4.) And as 
discussed, the court of appeals erred not only in failing to require appellate counsel to 
address the issues, but in rejecting Mr. Hutchings' position on a ground that the State 
now concedes is incorrect—namely, that aggravated assault is a general intent crime. 
The State attempts to deny Mr. Hutchings his ability to have the issue reviewed, 
even though the purpose of an Anders brief is to make certain that an appellate court 
adequately considers the merits of all of the issues raised—regardless of appellate 
counsel's desire to brief them or the State's desire to respond to them.11 The issues 
presented here were properly presented to the court of appeals and can be considered by 
this court under both ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error. While ineffective 
That underscores the problems with the State's position. Because the issues were not 
frivolous, the least to which Mr. Hutchings was entitled was an opportunity to present 
meritorious arguments with the assistance of appellate counsel. Had the court of appeals 
taken that minimal route, Mr. Hutchings would be in precisely the same position he is in 
here, except that the State would not be able to challenge the manner in which the issues 
were raised in prior proceedings. This court should not hold that the court of appeals' 
failure to order additional briefing somehow operates to waive Mr. Hutchings' right to 
raise the very issue on which the court of appeals should have ordered additional briefing. 
11
 The court of appeals docket for this case is attached as Addendum E. 
1A 
assistance of counsel is the most straightforward route, as discussed below, plain error is 
an alternative route to appellate review of the defects in Instruction 27. 
BL The State's Invited Error Argument Fails Because Trial Counsel Did 
Not Invite the Error And the State Waived Its Invited Error Argument 
The erroneous jury instructions were not invited by trial counsel. Regardless, the 
State waived application of the invited error doctrine by representing to the court of 
appeals that the invited error doctrine does not apply to any jury instruction issues. 
This court applies invited error when "counsel, either by statement or act, 
affirmatively represented to the trial court that he or she had no objection to the 
proceedings." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^ 14, 128 P.3d 1171 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Appellate courts apply the doctrine because of the preference for 
permitting trial courts to decide issues in the first instance and to prevent trial counsel 
from misleading the trial court. State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, % 54, 70 P.3d 111. 
Under invited error doctrine, the mere failure to object does not constitute invited error, 
which requires some affirmative conduct that leads the trial court to believe a party 
approves of the court's handling of an issue. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 
1993); see also State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^  9, 86 P.3d 742 ("[A] party who fails 
to object to or give an instruction may have an instruction assigned as error under the 
manifest injustice exception . . . . " (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e))). 
Invited error does not preclude consideration of Mr. Hutchings' plain error 
argument. First, trial counsel did not engage in any affirmative conduct sufficient to 
invite errors in Instruction 27. Second, the State waived its invited error argument, and, 
not without some irony, under its own broad reading of invited error doctrine, "invited" 
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the court of appeals to disregard any invited error with regard to jury instructions. The 
State represented to the court of appeals that it need not address invited error because 
"the record does not contain the proposed jury instructions from either party, and the trial 
transcripts do not contain the discussion between the court and counsel regarding the 
proposed instructions." (Add. C at 4 n.2). 
1. Trial Counsel's Failure to Object Was Not an Affirmative Act 
Within the Meaning of Invited Error Jurisprudence 
The act on which the State would base invited error is a single statement. After 
hearing objections to a number of jury instructions, the trial court asked counsel 
"Anything else?" (R. 271:160.) Counsel responded, "No." (Id) That is not sufficient to 
constitute invited error as to the specific wording of Instruction 27. It is fundamentally 
different from a situation where an attorney proposes jury instructions the court adopts or 
affirmatively indicates that he has no objection to a specific instruction. Geukgeuzian, 
2004 UT 16, ^ f 12. Here, trial counsel failed to object, which triggers plain error analysis, 
but trial counsel did not lead the court into committing the error. 
At its most expansive, the invited error doctrine in Utah has been premised on 
instances where trial counsel "affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no 
objection to the jury instruction." Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, % 54. But even those cases 
involved either a greater degree of affirmative conduct or approval of a specific 
instruction after discussion of that instruction. For instance, in Hamilton, "[t]he trial 
court specifically required counsel to confirm on the record, that the State takes no 
exception to the instructions . . . nor does the Defense." Id. ^ 55 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (alteration in original). Similarly, in State v. Andersen, 929 P.2d 1107, 
1108-09 (Utah 1996), trial counsel responded that he had no objection after he was 
"specifically queried by the court" about a particular instruction. And in State v. Medina. 
738 P.2d 1021, 1021 (Utah 1987), "defense counsel not only failed to object to the 
proposed instruction, but she affirmatively stated that after reading it that she had no 
objection." Thus, in those cases where the court has found that saying "no objection" 
constituted invited error, the non-objection was linked to a specific inquiry about the 
issue at hand—not an inquiry as general as "Anything else?" 
Further, those cases represent the high-water mark of the invited error doctrine. 
Otherwise, legitimate issues will be artificially insulated from plain error review simply 
because the trial court periodically asks counsel if it would like to raise any issues. If the 
invited error doctrine were to apply here, there would be no meaningful distinction 
between failures to object and affirmative non-objections. This court should clarify that 
trial counsel must affirmatively state she has no objection to a specific instruction, not 
that she does not wish to raise additional issues generally. 
Regardless, because the confusing instructions here involve an element of the 
crime of aggravated assault, the error qualifies as a "manifest injustice" under this court's 
interpretation of Rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Jones, 823 
P.2d 1059 (Utah 1991) (Even though defendant failed to object to the lack of an elements 
instruction when the instructions were given, trial court's complete failure to give an 
elements instruction was clear error and required reversal of his conviction and remand 
for a new trial.). Plain error review is available. 
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2. The State Waived Its Invited Error Argument by Telling the 
Court of Appeals That Invited Error Is Inapplicable 
By representing to the court of appeals that the invited error doctrine does not 
apply, the State waived its right to raise invited error. A party must raise and adequately 
brief its claims of invited error. State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, ^  39 n.10, 82 P.3d 1106. 
And when a party fails to raise issues before the court of appeals, those issues may not be 
"raised on certiorari unless the issue arose for the first time out of the court of appeals' 
decision." DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443-44 (Utah 1995). 
Here, the State concedes that it failed to raise the issue of invited error before the 
court of appeals. (Resp. Br. at 26.) That is an understatement. Beyond simply failing to 
raise the issue of invited error, the State affirmatively represented to the court of appeals 
that the record did not support an invited error argument with regard to jury instructions. 
(Add. C at 4 n.2). The State told the court of appeals that the record was insufficient to 
support invited error. (Id.) The State explained that, though it had considered raising a 
claim of invited error, "[i]n this case . . . the record does not contain the proposed jury 
instructions from either party, and the trial transcripts do not contain the discussion 
between the court and counsel regarding the proposed instructions." (Id.) The State 
chose instead to allow the court to conduct its review under a plain error standard, 
representing to the court of appeals that there was no error because "the instruction at 
issue here was correct" and that "[t]he State accordingly does not ask this Court to 
i y 
The State has abruptly shifted course. The record cite it relies on for invited error here 
is the second volume of the trial transcript. (Resp. Br. at 26 (citing R. 271:160).) That 
transcript was cited repeatedly in the Anders brief Mr. Hutchings' counsel filed 
(including citations in the section of the Anders brief to which the State responded.). 
(Add. A at 6, 13, 14, 22.) The State makes no effort to explain how the record that it 
found inadequate before the court of appeals suddenly supports its claim of invited error. 
i o 
determine whether Defendant approved this instruction prior to its submission." (Id.) 
Because trial counsel's approval of instructions by responding "no" to "anything else?" 
concerned all instructions, not a specific instruction, the State's concession in the court of 
appeals applies with regard to Instruction 27. 
Ironically, what this demonstrates is that the State not only waived its claim of 
invited error, it actually invited the court of appeals to reach the merits of Mr. Hutchings' 
jury instruction issues under plain error standard.13 The court of appeals' opinion is 
based, in part, on the State's invitation: "Although Hutchings failed to object to these 
instructions in the trial court, he requests that we review them under the plain error 
doctrine. The State does not contest our review of these issues." Hutchings, 2009 UT 
App 330, *| 2 n.l. In such circumstances, the State may not now raise invited error. 
Finally, Mr. Hutchings notes the self-defeating nature of the State's arguments that 
Mr. Hutchings' claim is not properly before the court. Any invited error bolsters 
Mr. Hutchings' argument concerning ineffective assistance of counsel. Geukgeuzian, 
2004 UT 16, <| 13. The State sometimes recognizes that where an error is invited, "a 
defendant can obtain review only by alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in inviting 
the error." (Resp. Br. at 25.) But, as discussed, the State argues that this defendant is not 
The State argues that its invited error concession is no longer applicable because it was 
limited to the slightly different jury instruction claim raised by Mr. Hutchings' appellate 
counsel in the Anders brief. (Resp. Br. at 26, 27 n.l0.) That is incorrect. To the extent 
the concession was based on the State's inability to find record evidence of invited error 
related to any jury instructions, the concession extended to all jury instructions. Further, 
as discussed, the issue was properly raised in Mr. Hutchings' memorandum in support of 
his Anders issues. In its Anders response, the State represented that it had reviewed the 
record and concurred in then-appellate counsel's finding that Mr. Hutchings' arguments 
were frivolous. (Add. C at 4.) Thus, having reviewed and analyzed Mr. Hutchings' 
arguments and record cites, the State should have raised its invited error argument. 
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entitled to review on that ground either because, in the State's view, appellate counsel 
was constitutionally ineffective in failing to raise the ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel in the court of appeals. (Id. at 28.) Yet even through that lens, this court still 
may address the issues concerning Instruction 27. 
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, where appellate counsel 
fulfills Anders obligations, an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim survives if 
"counsel unreasonably failed to discover nonfrivolous issues and to file a merits brief 
raising them." Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285-86 (2000). And as the Utah 
Supreme Court has explained, "If we were to require defendant to present the claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel in a [new] proceeding . . . , we are not 
aware of any evidence or argument which might be made that is not now before us. We 
therefore conclude that in these peculiar, narrow circumstances, we should now address 
defendants claim and not require him to raise it later in a [new] proceeding . . . . " State 
v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). The issues are properly before 
this court, even on the State's view, because appellate counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective. 
Conclusion 
Mr. Hutchings' conviction for aggravated assault should be vacated. The jury was 
instructed that it could find Mr. Hutchings guilty of aggravated assault by finding that he 
had only a general intent to push Ms. Cuddeback's hand away from his face. That is how 
the court of appeals read the instructions, but it affirmed on the ground that aggravated 
assault was a general intent crime, something the State now concedes was incorrect. This 
court should reject the State's contention that the jury understood what the court of 
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appeals did not, namely that the jury instructions plainly state that aggravated assault 
requires a specific intent. 
Because the instructions misstated the State's burden, trial counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective in failing to object to the instructions. And to the extent 
appellate counsel failed to raise that issue—an issue Mr. Hutchings raised—then 
appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective. 
The jury's confusion caused by the instructions was prejudicial. Ms. Cuddeback 
testified that Mr. Hutchings pushed her arm away from him when she dug her fingernails 
into his face. That is consistent with Mr. Hutchings9 having only a general intent to push 
her arm back and not the specific intent to cause serious bodily injury, especially where 
the only injury caused was a broken hand. This court should vacate Mr. Hutchings' 
conviction on the aggravated assault charge. 
DATED this 14th day of February, 2011. 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
Troy L^Booher 
Christopher L. Stout 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Larry Lewis Hutchings 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
LARRY LEWIS HUTCHINGS, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 200806$ 1-CA 
wwspicnoNAy. STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 77-
l8a-l(lXa) (2006 as amended) and 78-4-103(2Xe) (2008 as amended). 
STATfiMENT OF TflE XSSUES ANP STAWPARPS OF REVffiW 
1. Did defense counsel and the prosecution have an improper relationship or 
did they conspire to deprive Mr. Hutchings of his due process rights? Questions of law 
are reviewed for correctness. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232,238 (Utah 1992). The 
issue was preserved in Mr. Hutchings* pro se "Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Amend Appellants BrietV see Addendum A. The issue is not otherwise contained in the 
record. 
2. Was the evidence insufficient to support a conviction? "We will not 
overturn a jury verdict unless the evidence presented at trial is "so insufficient that 
reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict" J. W. v. State, 2001 UT App 208 
I 
(citations omitted). Similarly, did the court err in not granting Mr. Hutchings* motion to 
dismiss? "[A] motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the state's case may be 
denied if the trial court finds that the state has established a 'prima facie case against the 
defendant by producing *bclievable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." 
State v. Emmett, S39 P.2d 781,784 (Utah 1992) (citation omitted). The evidence is to be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the state. See Mahmoodv. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ^  16, 
990P.2d933. The issue was preserved at trial. R 271:75-80. 
3. Did 'Vindictive prosecution" occur when the State amended the Information 
to alleged more serious crimes than the ones listed in the original information? Questions 
of law are reviewed for correctness. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232,238 (Utah 1992). 
The issue was preserved in Mr. Hutchings' pro se "Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Amend Appellants Brief;** see Addendum A. Mr. Hutchings response to counsel's 
characterization of this related issue is attached in Addendum B. 
4. Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Hutchings' Motion for a New Trial on 
the basis that prior trial counsel failed to investigate and raise the circumstances of his 
back injury to the jury? M(T]t is well settled that, as a general matter, the trial court has 
broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for a new trial. Under this standard of review, 
we will reverse only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision." State v. Redding, 
172 P3d 319,2007 UT App 350 (citations omitted). The issue was preserved in Mr. 
Hutchings' Motion for a New TriaL R. 269. 
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5. Did prior trial counsel perform ineffectively when he failed to object to an 
improper jury instruction. "This court reviews a trial court's failure to give accurate 
elements in a jury instruction under a correctness standard." State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 
1287,1290 (Utah App. 1994). This court has consistently held that '[f]ailure to give an 
elements instruction for a crime satisfies the manifest injustice standard under rule 19(c) 
and constitutes reversible error as a matter of law.'" American Fork v. Can, 970 P.2d 
717,720 (Utah App. 1998) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). "Further, because 
[t]he general rule is that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is 
essential, failure to provide such an instruction is reversible error that can never be 
considered harmless." State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602,608 (Utah App. 1998) 
(alteration in original) (quotations and citations omitted); see also State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 
1059,1061 (Utah 1991) C[T]he failure to give [an elements] instruction can never be 
harmless error."). 
Prior defense counsel did not object to the jury instruction. "When objections are 
not made at trial and properly preserved, appellate review is under a 'plain error' standard 
Plain errors are those that 'should have been obvious to the trial court and that affect the 
substantial rights of the accused.'" State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207,1210-11 (Utah App. 
1991) (citing State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29,35 (Utah), cerL denied, 493 U.S. 814 
(1989)); cf. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232,238 (Utah 1992) (Challenges to jury 
instructions ordinarily present a question of law, reviewed on appeal without deference to 
3 
the trial court). For unpreserved issues, the matter may be reviewed under the doctrines 
of plain error, manifest injustice, or ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Morgan, 
813 P.2d 1207,1210-11 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55 at 140,82 P3d 
1106 0"[M]anifest injustice' has been defined as being 'synonymous with the "plain error" 
standard."*); see also Casey, 2003 UT 55 at H 41 (The manifest injustice or the plain error 
standard requires the appellant to show that m(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should 
have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased 
differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined."'). 
"To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, 'a defendant must show (1) that 
counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been difFerent*" Mvers v. State, 
2004UT31,K20,94P.3d211. 
In addition, "When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 'is raised for the first 
time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, it presents a question of law/" State 
v. Isiah Bo'Ccge Vos, 2007 Ut App 215, ^9 (Utah App 2007) (citations omitted). 
4 
STATUTSS, RULES AND CQNSTmmONAL PROVISIONS 
The texts of the following relevant constitutional and statutory provisions are 
contained in this brief or Addendum C: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
to intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another: or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (I Xa), 
uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-60lor other means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
Id (emphasis added). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(11) ("serious bodily injury- includes "bodily injury 
that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of 
the function of any bodily member")-
CTATSOTENT OF THE£ASE 
On April 13,2006, the State filed an Information charging Mr. Hutchings with 
one count of Burglary, a Second Degree Felony; one count of Assault (Domestic 
Violence), a Class A Misdemeanor; and one count of Criminal Mischief a Class B 
Misdemeanor. R. 1-3. 
After Mr. Hutching* s Preliminary Hearing on June 13,2006, the State filed an 
Amended Information charging Mr. Hutchings with one count of Aggravated Burglary, a 
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First Degree Felony; one count of Aggravated Assault, a Second Degree Felony; and one 
count of Criminal Mischief, a Class B Misdemeanor. R. 4-5. 
Following the trial, the jury found Mr. Hutchings guilty of Criminal Mischief and 
Aggravated Assault R. 212-213. Mr. Hutchings was found not guilty of Aggravated 
Burglary. R.214 
On October 22,2007, the trial court sentenced Mr. Hutchings "to an indeterminate 
term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison" on 
Count II, Aggravated Assault, a 2nd degree felony. R. 229. Mr. Hutchings was "given 
credit for time serve[d]*' on Count m, Criminal Mischief. R.230. The trial court ordered 
that Mr. Hutching's sentence to "run consecutively to time now serving at Utah State 
Prison.** R. 230 
STATEMENT Qf THE FACTS 
On April 6,2006, Larry Hutchings went to 120 £. Utopia Avenue, #2, a place 
where he resided. R 271:106. His girlfriend, Deborah Cuddeback, would not open the 
door. R 271:113. Mr. Hutchings kicked in the door to retrieve some of his personal 
belongings whereupon he was attacked by Ms. Cuddeback. R 271:113-14. According to 
the State, however, Mr. Hutchings was the aggressor who grabbed the victim and 
assaulted her. During the altercation, Ms. Cuddeback scratched and bruised Mr. 
Hutchings about the neck and face. R 271:115-17,120. Ms. Cuddeback's hand was 
broken; she had discomfort in her neck and other parts of her body. R 271:42,47. 
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Not finding proof of all the elements of Aggravated Burglary, the jury found Mr. 
Hutchings not guilty of "intentionally or knowingly... enterfing] or remaining] 
unlawfully in the dwelling [of] Deborah Cuddeback... [w]ith the intent to commit an 
assault on any person; and... [tjhat in attempting, committing, or fleeing from a burglary, 
the defendant caused bodily injury to Deborah Cuddeback, who was not a participant in 
the crime.** R 181 (the elements of Aggravated Burglary are contained in Instruction 7). 
His acquittal on that charge, though, was ofiset by his convictions for Aggravated Assault 
and Criminal Mischief, from which he appeals. 
Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Clayton, 639 
P.2d 168 (Utah 1981), appellate counsel for Mr. Hutchings hereby files a hybrid "Anders" 
brief. Point I and its subsections are raised pursuant to Anders. Point II is raised 
separately by appellate counsel without any reference to Anders, 
No evidence exists in the record in terms of any improper attempts between the 
prosecution and defense counsel to conspire against Mr. Hutchings. The record speaks 
for itself as to the actions or inactions taken by defense counsel during trial and on appeal. 
Sufficient evidence existed in the record to establish "serious bodily injury.** Mr. 
Hutchings disagrees with that assessment and appears to argue that the lack of distinction 
between "serious bodily injur/* and "substantial bodily injury** entitles him to the benefit 
of a lesser charge. 
7 
Mr. Hutchings argues that the mental state of "intentionally*1 was not proven at 
trial. Counsel expounds on that issue and notes that because the jury was allowed to base 
its Aggravated Assault conviction on the lesser mental state of "knowingly," the 
conviction must be reversed due to the improper elements instruction. Assuming, 
arguendo, that sufficient evidence existed for the "intentionally" or "knowing!/* mental 
state, given the possibility that the jury used an inapplicable mental state in accordance 
with the flawed instruction, defense counsel performed ineffectively in allowing such an 
instruction to be given to the jury. The trial court also erred in allowed such an 
instruction since it was contrary to the plain language of the Aggravated Assault statute. 
ARfllflVffiNT 
POINT I. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL MAY BE BRIEFED IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE ANDERS AUTHORITY 
In Point I, Mr. Hutchings' issues are summarized below. His own pro se position 
is attached in Addendum A and Addendum B. 
A. DID DEFENSE COUNSEL AND THE PROSECUTION HAVE AN 
IMPROPER RELATIONSHIP OR DID THEY CONSPIRE TO DEPRIVE 
MR. HUTCHINGS OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS? 
According to Mr. Hutchings, one of his arguments appears to suggest that his trial 
counsel and/or his appellate counsel are not appropriately representing him: 
The defendant's attorneys Jason Poppleton and Lisa Remal(J as members of the 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association [and] also [as] a state agency[,] have a 
close and continuous reIations[hip] with the prosecuting office and the court itself 
through discrete, ami[a]ble relationships with the judge, through the court family. 
In defendant's case it appears that his defense counsel was careful not to 
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compromise or weaken the[tr] relationship by any seemingly antagonistic action in 
defense of the defendant A definite altitude] of "Go and get along** will be 
shown as to [be] defense counsel's approach in defendant's defense. The same 
appears to be the approach of appellant counsel, Ron Fujino, in this appeal. 
See State of Utah v. Larry Lewis Hutchings. "Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Amend Appellant's Brief;** page 2, dated January 21,2009 (hereinafter Hutchings' Issues) 
(attached as Addendum A). 
In contrast to Mr. Hutchings* claims, however, no evidence exists in the record 
regarding any improper relationship between the prosecution and defense counsel. The 
record speaks for itself as to the actions or inactions taken by defense counsel during trial 
and on appeal. Other than the arguments made herein,1 there is no record basis for such 
an argument on appeal. Cf. Utah R- App. P. 1 l(eX2) ("Transcript required of all evidence 
regarding challenged finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that 
a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant 
shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or 
conclusion."); see also Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626,2001 ITT 96 ("Counsel cannot be 
found ineffective for failing to raise an ineffectiveness of counsel issue against himself or 
herself."). 
1
 In addition to the arguments briefed on appeal, Mr. Hutchings previously requested 
and mis Court denied his Rule 23B motion to remand the case for an ineffective of 
assistance of counsel determination. Utah R. App. P. 23B. 
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B. DID THE PROSECUTION FAIL TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF IN 
NOT PRESENTING SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A 
CONVICTION? 
While it may be understandable that Mr. Hutchings disagrees with the jury's 
verdict or its perception of the persuasiveness of the trial evidence, the standard of review 
on appeal means that the trial evidence may not be simply reargued to this Court as if it 
were another jury: 
This court has stated that in order to prevail on a sufficiency challenge to a jury 
verdict, "the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of 
the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the verdict** We will not overturn a jury verdict unless 
the evidence presented at trial is Mso insufficient that reasonable minds could not 
have reached the verdict*1 
The burden on a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is heavy. 
Defendant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings 
of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack. This 
court 'must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of 
the evidence [presented at trial], or if [we] otherwise reachQ a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made.* The conviction, however, 'must be 
supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as 
charged from which the [factfinder] may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt* 
J.W. v. State, 2001 UT App 208 (citations omitted). 
1. A Quantum Of Evidence Existed For Serious Bodily Injury 
According to Mr. Hutchings, "the prosecution has never at any time produced 
evidence of a serious bodily injury having been caused to another by anyone[,] let alone 
the defendant** Hutchings* Issues, page 9. The aggravated assault jury instruction and 
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the corresponding statute both require proof of "serious bodily injury.** R 186 (Jury 
Instruction 14 is attached as Addendum D); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(lXa); Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b) (subsection (b) of the aggravated assault statute is inapplicable 
because it was not part of the instruction given to the jury).2 
MA person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 
76-5-102 and he... intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another.** Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-103. Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(11), "serious bodily injury" includes 
"bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member.** Id As reflected by the following 
excerpted portions of the trial transcripts, for the element of serious bodily injury a 
quantum of evidence existed from which the jury may base its conclusion of guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt Ms. Cuddeback expressly testified about sustaining protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of her hand: 
Ms Cuddeback: That's as far as I can bend my hand still. 
1
 Mr. Hutchings also appears to argue that because subparagraph (b) requires "force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury,** he was improperly convicted. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1 Xb) (emphasis added). Assuming the correctness of his 
statement that that there was no force likely to produce death in this case, there still was 
force likely to produce serious bodily injury - force a step below the jury finding that he 
actually corned serious bodily injury to another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1 X*)-
Again, the issue is a non-issue because the subparagraph (b) language was not presented 
to the jury in the instruction. R186. 
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Ms. Parkinson: What type of work do you do? I know you don't want to say 
where you work, but what type ofwork do you do? 
Ms. Cuddeback: Housekeeping. 
Ms. Parkinson: So do you use your hand a lot then? 
Ms. Cuddeback: I do. 
Ms. Parkinson: Has it been difficult to use your hand? 
Ms. Cuddeback: Very. 
Ms. Parkinson: How so? 
Ms. Cuddeback: I clean millions of toilets. And I use a rag, and it has all these 
metal works on the back. And you have to wipe in here and 
there. And I hit it on me thing all the time. And just pushing 
the bathroom cart that we push from place to place, you have 
to squeeze it and push the thing along. It gets very sore after 
a while. 
Ms. Parkinson: Are you right handed? 
Ms. Cuddeback: I am very much right handed. 
Ms. Parkinson: Has this injury effected the way you write? 
Ms. Cuddeback: Oh, yeah, big time. 
Ms. Parkinson: Your Honor, if we could have the witness step down and 
show the jury her injuries? 
The Court: Any objection? 
Mr. Poppleton: No objection. 
The Court If there is no objection from the defease, that's fine. 
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Ms. Parkinson: If you could just show the jury how you can move your hand, 
or if you can't move your hand and where your knuckle is. 
Ms. Cuddeback: I can only bend it right here. 
Ms. Parkinson: So could you show us the other hand where the knuckle 
should be aligned? And let's see your other hand. So can you 
actually close your fist? 
Ms. Cuddeback: I could, but just this far. 
See R. 272:61; R. 272:65-67. In addition to Ms. Cuddeback's testimony, Dr. Steven 
Mimnaugh's testimony provided more evidence of serious bodily injury: 
Mr. Burmesten Even without the further specialist, you mention a certain 
amount of time that the bone would have to be immobilized. 
Assuming it all welded back miraculously perfect, how long 
would that take? 
Dr. Mlmnaugh: It would probably take - six weeks would be a good guess of 
constant immobilization. There are implications to the 
immobilization because then the muscles get weak and 
tendons can shorten and joints can get stiff. And so then 
there's - usually will have the patients do a course of hand 
therapy to make sure that the hand goes back to its normal 
function. 
Mr. Burmesten While it's immobilized or after? 
Dr. Mimnaugh: After. After. So you are sure the bone is really set up. 
Mr. Burmesten So the setup time takes how long? 
Dr. Mimnaugh: About six weeks. 
Mr. Burmesten And then assuminglhat is successful, a rime of physical 
therapy for how long would you guess? 
Dr. Mimnaugh: Probably four weeks. 
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R- 271:53-54. Sufficient evidence was presented for proving "serious bodily injury." 
2. The Evidence Presented At Trial Satisfied The Intent Requirement of 
"Knowingly" 
According to Mr. Hutchings, "the prosecution failed to ever present any evidence 
[of] intent, [specifically] as to the specific element[,] intentionally." Hutchings1 Issues, 
page 9. However, as discussed below, the more glaring problem was that the jury was 
improperly allowed to base its conviction on the lesser mental state of "knowingly." See 
infra Point II; R 198 (injury instruction 27, the mental states of "intentionally" AND 
"knowingly" were both presented to the jury); R 271:178 (during closing argument, the 
prosecution addressed the "knowingly" element of aggravated assault). 
Assuming, arguendo, that the "intentionally" or "knowingly" mental state may 
have been satisfied by the evidence presented at trial, there is no way for this Court to 
know which mental state the jury relied on during its deliberations. Since the jury may 
have based its conviction on the "knowingly" mental state, see R 186 (jury instruction 14) 
and R 198 (jury instruction 27), the trial court improperly allowed them to consider a 
mental state below the greater mental state of "intentionally" in reaching its verdict 
The jury was not properly informed about the difference between "knowingly" and 
"intentionally." Such a result constitutes prejudicial error and requires reversal. State v. 
Hasten, 846 P.2d 1276,1277 (Utah 1993) (per curiam) ("Since the jury was allowed to 
consider the depraved indifference alternative, as well as those states of mind described in 
subsections (a) and (b) of section 76-5-203(1), defendant is entitled to a new trial."); see 
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Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307,322 (1985) ("Nothing in these specific sentences or in 
the charge as a whole makes clear to the jury that one of these contradictory instructions 
carries more weight than the other. Language that merely contradicts and does not 
explain a constitutionally infirm instruction will not suffice to absolve the infirmity. A 
reviewing court has no way of knowing which of the two irreconcilable instructions the 
jurors applied in reaching their verdict"); see infra Point II. 
C. DID "VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION" OCCUR WHEN THE STATE 
AMENDED THE INFORMATION TO ALLEGED MORE SERIOUS 
CRIMES THAN THE ONES LISTED IN THE ORIGINAL 
INFORMATION? 
According to Mr. Hutchings, the prosecution's decision to amend the charges 
listed in the Information amounted to vindictive prosecution. After the preliminary 
hearing, the State asserted its position: 
And your Honor, the State would rest at this point The State has informed 
defense Counsel that the offer is withdrawn once the preliminary hearing went 
forward. 
The State also told defense Counsel that we would be amending the Information 
to an aggravated burglary, Count I, instead of burglary now as a second-degree 
felony; and the second count would be an aggravated assault, as a second-degree, 
causing serious bodily injury. Defense Counsel was aware of that 
R. 31:30. The court allowed me amendment and bound-over the charges. R. 31:31. 
"The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time 
before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial rights of 
the defendant are not prejudiced." Utah R. Crim P. 4(d). Mr. Hutchings correctly views 
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the State's amendment as improper because a "different offense is charged." Id, 
However, the second part of Rule 4 hinders his argument 
Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211 (Utah, 1993), provides guidance. Defendant 
Tillman also argued that his substantial rights were prejudiced by an amendment to the 
information. Rejecting his argument, the supreme court explained the "[h]e was bound 
over after the information was amended; therefore, the circuit court found probable cause 
in the evidence to support it Moreover, the information was amended on August IS, 
1982, and the trial did not begin until January 4,1983. Thus, Tillman's attorneys had 
more than three months after the amendment to prepare a defense to the additional 
aggravating circumstances alleged. Id at 215-16. 
Similarly, in Mr. Hutchings* case, he was bound over after the information was 
amended, with probable cause found by the circuit court Since Mr. Hutchings' trial then 
did not commence until September 4,2007 - approximately 15 months after the 
preliminary hearing, his notice of the amendment and the opportunity to defend the 
aggravated assault charges were at least as great as the 3 month time period afforded 
Tillman to defend in his death penalty case. See also State v. Kirgan, 712 ?2d 240 
(1985) (citation omitted) (aA variance between an information and the proof will be 
considered immaterial in a case in which it appears that the defendant's right to notice and 
fair opportunity to defend have not been infringed and the record is such as to protect the 
defendant against another prosecution for the same offense."). 
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Due to governing authority, which allowed the State to amend the Information 
after the preliminary hearing, the lack of improper action by the State nullifies the 
vindictive prosecution argument 
D. DID TRIAL COUNSEL PERFORM INEFFECTIVELY WHEN IT 
FAILED TO INVESTIGATE THE DEFENDANTS BACK INJURY? 
According to Mr. Hutchings, his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 
investigate his back injury and to present evidence of his injury to the attention of the 
jury. The parties disagreed on the nature of the struggle which formed the basis for the 
aggravated assault charge. Mr. Hutchings' position is that had the jury known about his 
back injury, his account would have been believed over the victim's account because his 
back injury prevented him from acting (or assaulting) anyone in the manner alleged. In 
his Motion for a New Trial, the issue was addressed by prior defense counsel: 
What I [defense counsel] can say, in fairness to Larry [Hutchings] is this, 
obviously he went to the hospital. I'm sure there was some conversation about 
why he went to the hospital and obviously he would have relayed the information 
that he had a back injury. So in fairness to Larry, that conversation probably took 
place but whether or not he told us it was as a result of the date in question, April 
6th of 2006,1 don't have any recollection of that and I don't believe that to be the 
case. I would say with certainty that Mr. Hutchings never did ask us to talk to his 
doctor, he never asked us to get medical records from doctor. That I can say with 
certainty. 
R. 269:11-12. 
During the Motion for a New Trial, Mr. Hutchings also informed the judge that at 
trial, he did not discuss his back injury in front of the jury: 
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[Defense counsel]: In your testimony did you reference the injuries that you had 
sustained? 
Mr. Hutchings: Other than the facial injuries at the time, no sir, I didn't. 
[Defense counsel]: And why not? 
Mr. Hutchings: I just - it slipped my memory at that point 
R. 269:6. 
After the evidence was presented during the Motion for a New Trial, the trial court 
ruled on the back injury issue as follows: 
I've [the court] listened to the evidence that's been presented here. Again, I was 
the one that presided over the trial so I'm familiar with the trial and the evidence 
that was presented at trial and I've read the memorandums. I'm going to deny the 
defendant's motion. 
I'm sorry, Mr. Hutchings, but I'm denying your motion. I don't think you've met 
either prong of the Strickland case and requirements. I don't think that you've 
shown that your counsel's performance was objectively deficient I've heard 
testimony from counsel that they might have been aware of your back injury but at 
no time were they aware that you were seeking to have your doctor questioned by 
them nor your medical records to be examined and possibly introduced at the time 
of trial. In fact, I've heard your own testimony that during the course of the trial 
you spoke about this being basically self-defense against the alleged victim but 
even in your testimony you never brought up the fact of the back injury and you 
never mentioned it in the course of the trial while on the stand or to your counsels 
during the course of the trial and you were obviously aware of your back injury. 
You did claim that you had received certain injuries, I remember that during the 
trial from the alleged victim and that did come out to the jury and they still 
believed that you were the aggressor and I think that there was enough evidence 
for them to be able to do that 
I don't even think with that I have to get to the second prong but I'm surely not 
convinced alter having heard all the evidence that even if that came out in trial, it 
would have made any difference in the jury's verdict in regards to this matter. You 
had given testimony that you were injured, maybe not specifically in regards to 
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your back but to other injuries and I'm not sure that this would have convinced the 
jury to find any differently than they did find. So for those reasons Pm denying 
your motion. 
R. 269:16-17. 
M[I]t is well settled that, as a general matter, the trial court has broad discretion to 
grant or deny a motion for a new triaL Under this standard of review, we will reverse 
only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision." State v. Redding, 172 P.3d 319, 
2007 UT App 350 (citations omitted). Given the discretion afforded the trial court for 
determining whether to accept or reject Mr. Hutchings testimony over his counsel's 
testimony, "no reasonable basis" exists in the record for a reversal on this issue. The 
lower court acted within its discretion in finding that at "no time were they [counsel] 
aware that you were seeking to have your doctor questioned by them nor your medical 
records to be examined and possibly introduced at the time of trial.** R. 269:16-17. The 
allegations do not meet the requirements of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984). 
E. IN THE EVENT THIS COURT FINDS REVERSIBLE ERROR, DOES 
THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE PREVENT A RE-TRIAL OR RE-
SENTENCING? 
According to Mr. Hutchings, the Double Jeopardy clause prevents this Court from 
remanding his case for re-trial or re-sentencing on a lessor included charge not included 
in the jury instructions. The issue is premature at this point of the briefing schedule, but 
the following principles are noted. 
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[T]he double jeopardy guarantee contained in [the state and federal constitution] 
protects a defendant from (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after 
acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) 
multiple punishments for the same offense. 
The double jeopardy guarantee does not protect a defendant from a retrial for an 
offense when his conviction for that same offense has been reversed on appeal as a 
result of trial error. A caveat to this general rule is that when the conviction of a 
lesser offense implies an acquittal of a greater offense, double jeopardy bars retrial 
of the greater offense if the conviction for the lesser offense is reversed on appeal. 
State v. Low, 192 P3d 867,2008 UT 58 ffl 51-52 (citations omitted). Depending on how 
the appeal is resolved, the above authority may or may not be applied to the circumstances 
of this case. 
F. ANDERS CERTIFICATION 
Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Clayton, 639 
P.2d 168 (Utah 1981), appellate counsel seeks permission from this Court to withdraw 
from the appeal. Counsel hand-delivered a copy of the draft for the brief to Mr. 
Hutchings for his review. In response, Mr. Hutchings penned a response to the draft Mr. 
Hutching's initial arguments on appeal, as well as his response to the draft of the brief are 
attached in Addendum A and Addendum 8. On two occasions, counsel discussed the 
substantive arguments of the drafted brief with Mr. Hutchings. 
Although the brief represents a hybrid presentation of the respective positions of 
both appellate counsel and Mr. Hutchings, should Mr. Hutchings prevail in his appeal, 
trial counsel would be appointed to represent him during the lower court proceedings. 
Should Mr. Hutchings not prevail in his appeal, Mr. Hutchings1 right to appellate counsel 
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would not extend beyond his direct appeal (i.e not for a petition for certiorari, nor for 
subsequent habeas corpus proceedings). Ross v. Mqffittt4\7 U.S. 600 (1974). 
POINT D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS ELEMENT INSTRUCTION 
ON AGGRAVATED ASSAULT TO THE JURY 
The jury instruction on Aggravated Assault, Instruction 14, improperly set forth 
the mental state as either intentionally or knowingly. The elements portion of the jury 
instruction read: 
1. That on or about April 6,2006, in Salt Lake County, Utah, the defendant, 
LARRY HUTCHINGS; 
2. Intentionally or knowingly; 
3. Committed an assault on Deborah Cuddeback; and 
4. Intentionally caused serious bodily injury to her. 
R186 (Jury Instruction 14 is attached as Addendum D). 
By allowing the jury to convict Mr. Hutchings under the lesser mental state of 
"knowingly," as opposed to the more culpable mental state of "intentionally," the 
instruction disregarded the elements from the applicable aggravated assault statute. See 
State v. Harmon, 712 P.2d 291 n.2 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (citations omitted) ("failure 
to instruct on the elements of the crime is reversible error.'*). The aggravated assault 
statute reads in pertinent part: 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
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60 intentionally causes serious bodily iniurv to another or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection 0X*)» uses a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-60lor other means or force likely 
to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1) (emphasis added). 
The State's theory of aggravated assault, which was reflected injury instruction 
14, focused only on subsection 76-5-103OX*). See Addendum D. The intentional 
mental state is clearly and unequivocally required under subsection 103OX&). 
The inapplicable section, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b), was not part of jury 
instruction 14. See Addendum D. Admittedly, subsection OXb) does not require the 
intentional mental state, but since subsection (IXb) was not part of the jury's 
deliberations, the lesser mental states of knowingly or recklessly were inapplicable for 
Mr. Hutchings* trial. See State v. McElhaney, 579 P.2d 328 (Utah 1978) (footnote 
omitted) ("Under 76-5-lO3(lX*0 the prosecution must prove the defendant intentionally 
caused serious bodily injury to another, but under 76-5-103(l)(b) no culpable mental state 
is specified and thus under 76-2-102 "intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to 
establish criminal responsibility"). 
In the case at bar, trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to 
fully and appropriately object to instruction 14. Granted, counsel partially requested the 
insertion of the word, "intentional," into the accompanying assault instruction, R 271:152, 
but such a request did not correct the otherwise improperly inserted "knowingly** mental 
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state for the aggravated assault jury instruction. State v. Hasten, 846 ?2a 1276,1277 
(Utah 1993) (per curiam) ("Since the jury was allowed to consider the depraved 
indifference alternative, as well as those states of mind described in subsections (a) and 
(b) of section 76-5-203(1), defendant is entitled to a new trial."); see Francis v. Franklin* 
471 U.S. 307,322 (1985) ("Nothing in these specific sentences or in the charge as a 
whole makes clear to the jury that one of these contradictory instructions carries more 
weight than the other. Language that merely contradicts and does not explain a 
constitutionally infirm instruction will not suffice to absolve the infirmity. A reviewing 
court has no way of knowing which of the two irreconcilable instructions the jurors 
applied in reaching their verdict"). Prior counsel's inactions constituted deficient 
performance and it was unreasonable for counsel to act in a manner contrary to the 
language in the Aggravated Assault statute. Absent the error, the outcome would have 
been different 
Moreover, the trial court committed plain error in allowing the jury instruction on 
Aggravated Assault to be in clear violation of the plain language of the corresponding 
statute. Compare Addendum D with Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(lXa). Allowing the 
jury to consider a lesser mental state as a basis for a conviction is plain error. The error 
should have been obvious to the trial court because of the statutory language. And the 
error was harmful because this Court is unable to determine if the jury improperly relied 
on the lesser mental state during its deliberations. A new trial is required. 
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POSITION ON ORAk ARGUMENT 
Oral argument is not requested. 
CQNCWSIQN 
Defendant/Appellant, Larry Lewis Hutchings, respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse his conviction and remand his case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this 1 $ day of June, 2009. 
Ronald S. tuiino Fuji  
Attorney for Mr. Hutchings 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I have caused the original and seven copies of the foregoing to 
be hand-delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th Floor, P. O. Box 
140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two copies to the Utah Attorney General's 
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this iy of June, 2009. 
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Case No. 20080681 - C A 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Larry Lewis Hutchings, 
Defendant/ Appellant 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICnON 
Defendant appeals from convictions for aggravated assault a second degree 
felony, and criminal mischief/ a class B misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue: Defendant raises five issues in his brief. Four of the issues are 
addressed by defense counsel in an Anders brief. The State concurs in the analysis 
set forth therein. 
Through counsel/ Defendant also argues that the trial court erred when it 
submitted a jury instruction that allowed the jury to consider whether Defendant 
knowingly assaulted his victim. 
Standard of Review. Defendant acknowledges that he did not object to this 
issue below. As such, this Court should only reverse if it determines that there was 
manifest error. State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 21 If J 53-54> 70 P.3d 111; State v. Bolson, 
2007 UT App 268, f 11,167 P3d 539.l 
CONSminiONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-102 (West2004) and Utah Code Annotated § 76-
5-103 (West 2004) are attached as Addenda to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 13,2006, Defendant was charged with one count of burglary, one 
count of assault, and one count of criminal mischief. R. 1-3. On August 14,2006, the 
State filed an amended information charging Defendant with one count of 
aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of criminal 
mischief. R. 4-5. 
Defendant was tried from September 4-5, 2007. R 166-71. Following 
deliberations, the jury convicted Defendant of aggravated assault and criminal 
mischief, but acquitted him of aggravated burglary. R. 212-15, 
1
 Defendant incorrectly suggests that the standard for reviewing an 
unpreserved challenge to a jury instruction is plain error. As noted above, such 
claims are reviewed for manifest error. As a functional matter, however, Utah courts 
have analyzed the two standards using the same test State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 
1107,1109 (Utah 1996). 
2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant raises five issues in his brief. The first four issues are addressed by 
defense counsel in an Anders brief. The State concurs in defense counsel's analysis, 
and accordingly asks this Court to reject those arguments as frivolous. 
With respect to the fifth issue, Defendant argues that the jury received an 
incorrect instruction on the elements of aggravated assault Although Defendant 
claims that the jury should not have considered whether his conduct was knowing; 
the aggravated assault statute specifically requires the State to prove that an assault 
occurred, and settled law allows the State to prove assault through knowing 
conduct Defendant's argument should therefore be rejected. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
UNLESS DIRECTED TO DO SO BY THIS COURT, THE STATE 
OFFERS NO RESPONSE TO THE ANDERS ISSUES 
With respect to issues I. A-I.E, defense counsel has filed a brief pursuant to 
Anders v. California, 386 US. 783 (1967). Aplt Br. 8-21. "Because of the special 
nature of the Anders brief, the attorney general [is not] expected to file a responsive 
brief." State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168,170 (Utah 1981), 
3 
The State has reviewed the record and concurs in the analysis offered by 
defense counsel. As set forth therein, these arguments are frivolous and should be 
rejected. 
n. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT MANIFEST ERROR 
WHEN IT SUBMITTED JURY INSTRUCTION 14 
In Point II of his brief, Defendant argues that Instruction # 14 misstated the 
law by "allowing the jury to convict Mr. Hutchings under the lesser mental state of 
'knowingly/ as opposed to the more culpable mental state of 'intentionally.'" Aplt 
Br. 21. According to Defendant, the only mental state that is at issue in an 
aggravated assault charge is the "intentional" mental state. Aplt Br. 21-23. 
Defendant acknowledges that he did not object to this instruction below, but asks 
this Court to review it for plain error. Aplt 3. Contrary to Defendant's claim, 
however, the instruction at issue was correct2 
2
 This Court ordinarily refuses to review unpreserved challenges to jury 
instructions where the defendant approved the instruction prior to its submission to 
the jury. See, e.g.. State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, W 54-55,70 P3d 111. In this case, 
however, the record does not contain the proposed jury instructions from either 
party, and the trial transcripts do not contain the discussion between the court and 
counsel regarding the proposed instructions. 
But, as explained below, the instruction at issue here was correct The State 
accordingly does not ask this Court to determine whether Defendant approved this 
instruction prior to its submission. 
4 
Instruction # 14 defined the elements of aggravated assault as follows: 
(1) That on or about April 6, in Salt Lake County, Utah, the defendant 
LARRY HUTCHINGS; 
(2) Intentionally or knowingly; 
(3) Committed an assault on Deborah Cuddeback; and 
(4) Intentionally caused serious bodily injury. 
R186. Contrary to Defendant's claim, this was a correct statement of the elements. 
Defendant was charged with second degree aggravated assault R. 4-5. 
Under Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-lG3(l)(a) (West2004), second degree aggravated 
assault has two elements. 
First the State must prove that the defendant "commitfted] assault as defined 
in Section 76-5-102." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(a). When proving this, there is 
no statutorily prescribed mens rea. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (West 2004). As 
such, the State is allowed to prove that the assault occurred through either 
intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (West 2004), 
and Utah courts have thus repeatedly held that a person can be convicted of assault 
based on knowing conduct See, e.g., State v. Atkin, 2006 UT App 155, U 9,135 P.3d 
894; State v. Jones, 878 P.2d 1175,1177-78 (Utah App. 1994). 
5 
Second, once the State has proven that an assault occurred "as defined in 
Section 76-5-102/' it then must prove that the assault was aggravated. By contrast to 
the assault element, the aggravated assault statute does contain a mens rea 
requirement for the aggravator. Specifically, the State must prove that the 
defendant "intentionally cause[d] serious bodily injury to another." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(a). 
Aggravated assault therefore involves two separate mens rea requirements. 
First, the State proves that an underlying assault occurred through either 
intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct; and second, the State must also prove that 
the defendant intentionally caused serious bodily injury. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
103(l)(a). 
The instruction at issue here therefore correcdy allowed the jury to determine 
whether Defendant's conduct was knowing. Under Instruction # 14(2)-(3), the State 
was allowed to prove that Defendant committed an underlying assault through 
either intentional or knowing conduct See R. 186. And under Instruction # 14(4), 
the State was required to prove the aggravator by intentional conduct See R. 186. 
The State recognized these separate requirements at trial. During the State's 
closing argument, for example, the State argued that Defendant had "intentionally 
or knowingly committed an assault on Deborah Cuddeback." R 271:178. The State 
6 
then separately argued that Defendant had "intentionally caused serious bodily 
injury." R. 271:178. 
Given this, there was no error, let alone manifest error in Instruction # 14.3 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted July J i , 2009. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
RYAN(D/TENNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
3
 In his Supplemental Response to the Anders brief, Defendant also argues that 
there is no "definable" distinction between the serious bodily injury and substantial 
bodily injury requirements set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 76-l-504(10)-(ll) 
(West 2004). Aplt Br. Addendum Bat 1-2. This claim does not appear to have been 
addressed in defense counsel's Anders brief. Regardless, it, too, is frivolous. 
Under Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-504(10), a serious bodily injury involves a 
"permanent disfigurement" or "protracted loss or impairment of the function of any 
bodily member or organ." By contrast, Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-504(11) states 
that a substantial bodily injury only involves an injury "not amounting to serious 
bodily injury," that causes "temporary disfigurement" or "temporary loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." Thus, by statute, the 
two requirements are differentiated by the duration of the impairment Defendants 
argument should therefore be rejected. 
7 
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State of Utah, 
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v. 
Larry Lewis Hutchings, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20080681-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 13, 2009) 
2009 UT App 330 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 061902496 
The Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs 
Attorneys: Ronald Fujino, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Ryan D. Tenney, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Thorne, and McHugh. 
McHUGH, Judge: 
Larry. Lewis Hutchings appeals his convictions for aggravated 
assault and criminal mischief. Hutchings raises multiple issues 
on appeal, challenging his convictions. With respect to all but 
one of those issues, Hutchings's lawyer has filed an Anders 
brief, and Hutchings has filed a memorandum to supplement 
counsel's brief. See generally Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 
738 (1967) (describing the procedures that appointed counsel must 
follow when he believes his client's claims on appeal are 
frivolous); State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 169-70 (Utah 1981) 
(adopting Anders requirements "as an expression of the 
requirements of due process of law" under the Utah Constitution). 
Because our independent review convinces us that the issues 
identified by Hutchings's counsel in the Anders brief (the Anders 
issues) are indeed frivolous, see generally State v. Romano, 29 
Utah 2d 237, 507 P.2d 1025, 1025 (1973) (defining "frivolous" as 
"having no basis in fact or law"), we do not consider those 
issues further. See Clayton, 639 P.2d at 170 (holding that an 
appellate court may grant a withdrawal and affirm a conviction if 
it unanimously determines that an appeal is wholly frivolous). 
Apart from the Anders issues, appellate counsel argues that 
the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on the culpable 
mental state required for aggravated assault and the definition 
of "intentional."1 "Whether a jury instruction correctly states 
the law presents a question of law which we review for 
correctness." State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, 1 13, 193 P.3d 92. 
The jury instruction on aggravated assault provided, 
Before you can convict . . . HUTCHINGS 
. . . of Aggravated Assault, . . . you must 
find from all of the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt, each and every one of the 
following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about April 6, 2 006, in 
Salt Lake County, Utah, . . . HUTCHINGS; 
2. Intentionally or knowingly; 
3. Committed an assault on [his 
girlfriend]; and 
4. Intentionally caused serious bodily 
injury to her. 
We agree with the State that the jury instruction correctly 
listed the elements of aggravated assault, including the culpable 
mental states. 
Aggravated assault requires that a person commit "assault as 
defined in [Utah Code s]ection 76-5-102, and . . . intentionally 
cause[] serious bodily injury to another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-103(1) (a) (2008) (emphasis added).2 An " [a]ssault is . . . an 
act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes 
bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily 
injury to another." Id. § 76-5-102. Because the assault statute 
does not provide the culpable mental state required to support a 
^Although Hutchings failed to object to these instructions 
in the trial court, he requests that we review them under the 
plain error doctrine. The State does not contest our review of 
these issues. 
2Because it is irrelevant to this appeal, we need not 
address the alternative element of aggravated assault, that is, 
the use of a dangerous weapon or other means likely to produce 
death in the commission of the assault, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-103 (1) (b) (2008) . 
20080681-CA 2 
conviction, "intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to 
establish criminal responsibility." Id. § 76-2-102. To be 
liable for aggravated assault, however, the defendant must also 
have intentionally caused serious bodily injury. See id. § 76-5-
103(1) (a). Thus, there are actually two mens rea requirements 
that must be met to convict a defendant of aggravated assault: 
the first is the intent, knowledge, or recklessness included in a 
simple assault charge; the second is the requirement that the 
defendant intentionally cause serious bodily injury. The 
challenged jury instruction correctly identified each of these 
mental state requirements.3 Accordingly, we reject counsel's 
claim that the jury instruction was erroneous.4 
Finally, Hutchings challenges the instruction to the jury 
that defined "intentional" conduct. That instruction stated, "A 
person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a 
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Hutchings 
argues that to be guilty of aggravated assault he must have 
intended to cause the serious bodily injury suffered by the 
victim, not simply the conduct that resulted in the serious 
bodily injury. We disagree. It is enough to satisfy the mens 
rea requirement if the defendant intends the act that results in 
serious bodily injury. See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1044 
n.l (Utah 1984) (upholding nearly identical instructions for 
intent). 
Because counsel has complied with the requirements of Anders 
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and because we confirm that 
the Anders issues are frivolous, we grant counsel's request to 
withdraw with respect to the Anders issues only and affirm the 
trial court's rulings with respect to those issues. In addition, 
the jury instructions properly informed the jury of the elements 
3Indeed, by not including recklessness as a basis for a 
finding of assault, the State was held to a higher standard of 
proof for that mens rea element than required by the statute. 
4Because we conclude that the jury instruction was proper, 
we need not address Hutchings's claim that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial lawyer failed to 
object to the instruction. 
20080681-CA 3 
of aggravated assault, including the mental states required. 
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
20080681-CA 4 
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